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Abstract: Miiller argues that double dissociations do not imply underlying
modularity of the cognitive system, citing neural networks as examples of
fully distributed systems that can give rise to double dissociations. We
challenge this claim, noting that such double dissociations typically do not
"scale-up," and that even some single dissociations can be difficult to
account for in a distributed system.
Miiller provides an extremely valuable and wide-ranging analysis
of the biological evidence concerning the basis of human lan-
guage, but we believe that he overstates the difficulties of inferring
modular organization from neuropsychological evidence (sects.
5.1 and 6.2). In traditional cognitive neuropsychology, double
dissociation (DD) is assumed to imply modularity of function. This
inference and its numerous exceptions have been discussed at
length by Shallice (1988; see also BBS multiple book review Precis
of From neuropsychology to mental structure, 14(3) 1991). Con-
trary to this, Miiller suggests that fully distributed systems can also
give rise to double dissociations, citing a number of connectionist
simulations (including a study by one of the present authors, Ganis
& Chater 1991).
Recent work suggests that producing DDs in distributed sys-
tems is not that straightforward. Consider the classic DD in
reading: surface dyslexics can read nonwords much better than
irregular words, whereas phonological dyslexics show the opposite
profile. This has been taken to imply that there are distinct lexical
and sublexical routes in reading (e.g., Coltheart et al. 1993). Early
single-route connectionist models of reading (e.g., Seidenberg &
McClelland 1989) that can pronounce both regular and irregular
words and nonwords cast doubt on the need for a dual route
model, and on the DD inference more generally (sects. 5.1 and
6.2). However, a more careful analysis of how these connectionist
models operate and respond to damage reveals a natural regularity
effect that leads to realistic surface dyslexia symptoms, but no
possibility of exhibiting symptoms anything like phonological
dyslexia (Bullinaria 1994). A similar pattern arises for the corre-
sponding developmental effects. Thus there are no reliable DDs
in these models.
A more detailed study (Bullinaria & Chater 1995) of quasiregu-
lar (rules plus exceptions) mappings in connectionist models
showed how the DDs that could be obtained in small-scale
networks evaporated into single (exceptions lost) dissociations
when they were scaled up to more realistic "fully distributed"
networks in which no single "neuron" had a significant effect on
the network's output. For a wide range of types of damage, the
networks showed selective impairment of exceptions, while regu-
lars were relatively preserved, but never the reverse pattern.
These effects were seen to be largely a simple consequence of
associations being learned more quickly and accurately the more
regular they were. In this sense, "regularity" is a measure of rate
of occurrence between contradictions, so high-frequency asso-
ciations must be considered more regular than low frequency
associations. A further complication arises because rich error-
correcting representations will naturally be more robust than
minimal sparse representations. We therefore have the possibility
of complementary dissociations in a single globally damaged
network resulting from differential rates of performance degrada-
tion due to separate "regularity" and "representation richness"
effects. Such trend dissociations are well known, however, and can
be ruled out by careful definition of DD requiring "crossover" (see
Shallice 1988, sect. 10.5). Thus, there are no reliable DDs in these
models.
This does not mean that we can only obtain DD by the specific-
loss of one of two "modules" that function in parallel, as in
traditional dual-route models of reading. It is quite possible for the
DD to occur as a result of damage to one of two modules operating
in series (Shallice 1988, sects. 10.5 and 11.2). For example, Plaut
(1995) shows how damage at two different locations of a single-
route recurrent network model can result in a DD between the
reading of concrete and abstract words. The DD does not imply
that the concrete and abstract words are processed separately, but
rather that they are differentially susceptible to damage at differ-
ent levels of processing. Whether one refers to the two levels (i.e.,
network locations) as different modules is simply a matter of
terminology - as long as there is no confusion, it does not matter.
Unfortunately, there often is confusion and, as a result, doubt is
cast upon the DD inference in situations where such doubt is not
justified. As far as we are aware, no recent advances in connection-
ist modelling require alterations to the general exposition of
Shallice (1988).
As noted elsewhere (e.g., Bullinaria & Chater 1995; Plaut 1995),
however, connectionism allows us to study neuropsychological
phenomena in finer detail than does the traditional "box and
arrow" account. Moreover, it promises to help us model compen-
satory factors (such as relearning) in the performance of neuropsy-
chological patients, which, as Miiller correctly points out, may
cause considerable difficulties in interpreting neuropsychological
data (e.g., see Plaut 1994).
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